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The 1967 Newark Riot and Mass Society:
An Analysis of the Representation of Collective Action

A Thesis in Sociology
by

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Abstract

My basic argument in this thesis is that the 1967 Newark riot was not as disorganized, chaotic, and irrational as it was represented in the media, and as it is remembered by many North Americans. In addition, the media did not report many of the incidents where law enforcement officials harassed Africa-Americans and used their weapons carelessly, as shown by the state government report. The media did not account for the level of organization that occurred during the riot, and the power relations between the African-American community and the federal, state, and local government. When I say the media, I refer, as I show in chapter 3, to Time, U.S. News and World Report, The Star Ledger, and The New York Times.

I argue that there are three important orientations embedded in the media's representation of the riot. In their discourse on the riot, I identified the following

- 1) The use of Mass Society notions and images,
- 2) The Racialization of the African-American
- 3) A strong belief on a pluralist model of politics

Mass society theorist view collective action as irrational and chaotic, and the actors as deviants. They view institutional collective action as rational and non-institutional collective action as irrational in part because of their belief on a pluralist model of politics. This is the idea that all groups in society have equal access to the system and an equal opportunity to change it. Mass society theorist also strongly fear the mass and view non-institutional collective action as disturbing a peaceful civil society. Thus, the role of the state is to "judiciously and firmly" restore law and order, as remarked by the Governor Hughes. The media throughout its explanation of the riot presented the riot as a chaotic phenomena and a disturbance to civil life.

In addition to the use of mass society notions and images, there was also the racialization of the African-American. This the ascription of certain characteristics to African-Americans because they are African-Americans, which include the ideas that African-Americans are deviant, irrational, lazy, wild, and dangerous. The racialization of the African-American goes well with mass society theory since they regard those that are involved in non-institutional collective action as irrational.

The racialization of the African-American was embedded in the articles that I analyzed and in the interviews that I conducted. Thus, in the July 24, 1967, U.S. News And World

Report article the authors said that thousand of Negroes were shouting "Kill White Devils." Governor Hughes referred to Newark as the jungle. Eugene Methvin referred to Newark as "all business and urban slum" and "Newarkers as human dregs." The word dreg, according to Webster's College dictionary, means the least valuable part of anything.

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Introduction

Goals, Method, and Biases

In the psyche of many United States citizens, the 1967 Newark riot represented an unorganized, undisciplined, and irrational event that lacked any justification. Some believe that those who rioted did so to acquire material items that they otherwise could not afford. Many, as well, discredit the African-American community's claim that the event was born out of police brutality and the federal, state, and city governments' constant dismissal and neglect of the needs of the community. The media represents the riot as chaotic, without any possible positive outcome for the community. This position has been supported by such accounts as Eugene Methvin's "Newark: The City Hate Wrecked," in his book The Riot Makers. This representation of the riot has been labeled in the social sciences as the mass society perspective of collective action. Different strains of the mass society perspective include the Kornhauser Model and the Smelserian model.

According to the mass society perspective, the crowd's actions lack organization, discipline, and objectives. Most importantly, the actors engage in unlawful activities, and

disrupt the usually peaceful civil society. The mass society perspective fails to recall the history of power relations between the community and society. Thus, the Newark riot is represented as an isolated and unitary event. I argue that adopting the mass society perspective renders an incomplete understanding of the Newark riot. I also argue that the mass society perspective is sometimes difficult to detect because it is part of the "normal" way of viewing reality. It is an elitist way of viewing reality because it does not fairly account for the people's action, while favorably presenting the actions of the state, and dismissing its sometimes unlawful actions.

In this thesis, I argue against the mass society perspective, which is reflected in Methvin's account of the Newark riot, in the media, and in the psyche of many United States citizens. I argue that there was a certain level of organization in the riot, and that the people had objectives. My point is that there was some structure in the events that occurred in Newark. This view is opposite to the view presented by the media, and what is remembered about the riots in the collective memory of many citizens.

This event reflected the historical relationship of the African-American community and the White community. As the population of whites in the city decreased, the population of non-whites- African-Americans, Cubans, and

Puerto Rican- increased. Although the city became increasingly non-white, those in power in the city administration remained white, mostly Italian-American.

In chapter 1, I explain the mass society perspective and part of its historical evolution. I identify some of the key tenets of the mass society perspective, in particular Gustave Le Bon's ideas on crowd behavior. I discuss E.P. Thompson and Charles Tilly to show aspects of collective action or collective violence that are not accounted by mass society theories. For example, Thompson in his study on eighteenth century food riots showed that the people had specific objectives, which was to regulate the economy to an extent that it allowed for the people's conception of a standard of living, or what Thompson called the "moral economy." The issues that Thompson has identified, in order to have a complete study of collective action, are culture, the history of the people with authorities, and the current power relations between the people and the state. Charles Tilly has also emphasized culture in his analysis of collective action. Tilly treats collective action as political, and strongly considers the claims that actors make to the state. These issues are not accounted by mass society theorists, thus Tilly and Thompson help show the pitfalls of the mass society perspective.

I use Davies to emphasize the political aspects of

collective action, and to suggest that politics is at the root of collective action. Her work supports the idea that collective action always deals with the configuration and distribution of power in society. While Thompson and Tilly have explicitly made these points, Davies makes her point using religious riots. Her analysis has discussed the political interpretation of religious riots to provide empirical examples against the mass society perspective. The mass society perspective in explaining collective action does not account for crowd's organization, history, and power relations with authorities. This is especially the case in the Newark riot.

In chapter 2, I give a critical overview of the riot and present some of the existing accounts. Chapter 3 is an analysis of the discourse on the riots in the media and government. I show where they adopt mass society images and terms. In chapter 4, I conclude with some thoughts on the politics of this discourse.

It is difficult to identify these concepts because sometimes it is the "normal" explanation of collective action in our culture, therefore many times because of its "normality" it is used unconsciously, and this is what makes it even more powerful. The unconscious use of mass society concepts make the concepts elusive, and even more powerful. In a way it works as what Althusser called the ideological

state apparatus.

I do not believe that the state or that the dominant economic class controls everything. I agree with Foucault that power is everywhere and there always exist alternative discourses and communities that oppose the dominant class. But I also think that there is a dominant class in society which controls most of the resources and the means of production. One needs to look no further than William Domhoff's Who Rules America Now ? to see how the dominant economic class operates in the United States of America¹ .

The methodology that I use reflects my epistemology on sociology and social reality. I studied newspapers, magazine articles, government documents, doctoral dissertations, and conducted interviews to make my argument. My study is fundamentally historical, but I use some of Paige's quantitative work to support my argument. I believe

¹ Domhoff (1983) argues in Who Rules America Now? against the pluralist view of power and contends that in the United States of America there is a social upper class, which he defines as the class that has a "dominant role in the economy and government" (pg.1). His main point is that although every group has power, the social upper class has the "ability to set the terms under which other groups and classes must operate" (pg.2). This social upper class reproduces itself by preparing its young through elite boarding schools and colleges, and maintain their power through social institutions such as eating clubs and social clubs. Domhoff also argues that the pluralist model of power is part of American culture. It is adopted by many North Americans and social scientist, similar to what is argued in this thesis; that the pluralist model of politics is a "normal" way of viewing reality in North American culture.

that both quantative methodology and qualitative methodology should be used without valuing one higher than the other, but viewing each as two different ways of assessing reality, and two different ways of reaching the goals of a particular study.

My biases lie in who I am. I am a Latino male who was raised in a urban environment. As a person of color, I have had certain experiences with law enforcement officials that have shaped my skeptical orientation toward their actions. I tried however in this study to present the evidence the way it was reported by the Government Commission, which in this quantitatively dominated society has a great deal of credibility. I hope that the testimonies and report given by the Commission, along with some of the critical studies, books, and articles stir some to reassess what happened in the Newark riot. That is my goal. To have people reconsider both their views on the Newark riot and their general view on collective action.

Chapter 1

The Theory of Mass Society

Mass society theory is everywhere, Salvador Giner argues in Mass Society (Giner, 1978). It is so commonplace that it is sometimes difficult to detect. Perhaps we can use Louis Althusser's notion of the ideological state apparatus to illustrate how the mass society perspective is employed by the state as an ideological force.² Because of its constant use by the media, government, and newspapers in our culture, the mass society perspective appears to us as natural.

The mass society perspective, though, has its roots in history, as Giner outlined, the mass society perspective can be traced back to the Pre-Socratic thinkers. The theory of mass society has certainly had numerous transformations and reinforcements throughout the nineteenth century, but it is in the twentieth century that there has been a more widespread use of the notion. The idea of mass society in contemporary times evolved in an attempt to explain the emergence of the modern world, and such issues as

² Althusser argued in 'Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus,' from Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, that the state's use of ideology is the most powerful weapon it has to control people and advance its class interests, and that the state has ideological apparatuses to advance its ideology (Althusser, 1972).

capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, and community.

This chapter will explain some fundamental concepts of "the mass" that makes up the mass society perspective of collective action. These concepts will then be identified in the media and government account of the riot in chapters 2 and 3. After the discussion on the main concepts of the mass society perspective, critiques offered by historians concerning the mass society perspective on crowd behavior will be reviewed. I hope to show the ways in which the mass society perspective deals with collective action and several issues that are not accounted for by mass society theorists in their explanation of collective action.

I Rational Individual and Irrational Masses

It can be said that the ethos behind the mass society image of society is one of "rule by fear." Mass society theorists fear the effect that mass action has, including the disruption of a peaceful civil society. For Giner (1976), this fear is embedded in history, he says, "the belief that a general revolt of the populace, bringing only doom to civilized life, is an inherent part of history" (p.3). This is the view espoused by the governing elite. For Hesoid, the "decay" of civilized life was caused by the mass' disregard for the law. Aristotle held that the revolt

of the masses occurs in important moments of the political life of a society. According to Giner (1976), the Romans believed that to control the "multitude" they must be "fed bread and cheap entertainment" (pg.23). This would ensure that the masses remain passive and abide by authority.³

Malthus argued that mobs inherently attracted tyrants, so he related the presence of the mob to a less egalitarian society. Increased population creates the conditions for mobs and eventually a society ruled by tyrants, he argued.

What Aristotle, the Romans, and Malthus indicate is that the mass society theory is not recent, but that it is historical and has undergone mutations throughout history. The aforementioned notions of "the mass" were indirectly asserted in the works of many, but for some the study of the mass was at the core of their projects.

In 1895, Gustave Le Bon set out to "scientifically explain" the behavior of the masses in The Psychology of The Crowd (Giner, 1976). For Le Bon, the study of the mass was central to the study of the modern world. As Giner (1976) reports Le Bon argues that "irrationality would utterly dominate people's lives, for the unconscious behavior of the masses would drive out of social life the conscious behavior

³ This is not a historical study of the theory of mass society. My goal is to note some of the main contributions to the formulation of mass society.

of the individual" (p.3). The import of Le Bon's study lies in the notion that **individuals act differently in a crowd**. The masses, according to Le Bon, are guided by any myth that unites them and provides for their self-sustenance. Thus, when a rational individual enters the crowd, the individual loses rationality and is guided by irrationality, as Giner (1976) explains:

Le Bon's psychological explanation of mass behavior and of the inner nature of crowds, which he skillfully combined with these sweeping historical visions, was as follows: modern industrial civilization favours the formation of multitudes and crowds, which in turn tend to plunge easily into states of acute turbulence. For the duration of any collective convulsion, the conscious personalities of the individuals who form the collectivity become suppressed. All feelings and emotions simultaneously become orientated towards one single object, which gives the whole crowd a remarkable homogeneity of conduct (p.58).

Thus, Le Bon has characterized the masses as an entity in which individuals lose their rationality for the irrationality or myth of the crowd. The mass has its own life. Le Bon relates the mass to a chaotic state. From Le Bon, we extract the notion that the mass is irrational and in a state of chaos.

According to Giner (1976), Le Bon labeled the crowd's unifying objective as the "mental unity of the crowd" (pg.57). The individual who becomes part of the crowd is no longer the same person because the individual is, says Giner (1976) "possessed by a sort of single-minded

collective soul"(pg.59). Thus, the person is dangerous only upon becoming part of the crowd. **It is the crowd that is inherently dangerous, not the person.** In addition to its possessive hold on the individual, Le Bon believes that the crowd's action are irresponsible and lack thought. As Le Bon (1895) states:

This very fact that crowds possess in common ordinary qualities explains why they can never accomplish acts demanding a high degree of intelligence. The decisions affecting matters of general interest come to by an assembly of men of distinction, but specialists in different walks of life, are not sensibly superior to the decisions that would be adopted by a gathering of imbeciles. The truth is, they can only bring to bear in common on the work in hand those mediocre qualities which are the birthright of every average individual. In crowds it is stupidity and not mother-wit which is accumulated (p.32).

For Le Bon, the crowd is an accumulation of the negative aspects of the individual. His notions of the crowd are an integral part of the mass society perspective; and although he wrote it in 1895, his negative notions of the crowd many times permeate newspapers and magazines in their explanation of collective action, even today.

For Le Bon, "civilization" is positive and "crowd action" is negative. He correlates civilization with intelligence and aristocracy, but correlates the mass with destruction and disorder. These are important concepts of the mass society perspective; for in many newspapers crowd action is characterized as destructive to a normally

integrated society. In the following quote, Le Bon (1895) expresses his characterization of crowd behavior:

Civilizations as yet have only been created and directed by small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful for destruction. Their rule is always tantamount to a barbarian phase. A civilization involves fixed rules, discipline, a passing from the instinctive to the rational state, forethought for the future, an elevated degree of culture- all of them conditions that crowds, left to themselves, are incapable of realising. In consequence of the purely destructive nature of their power, crowds act like those microbes which hasten the dissolution of the enfeebled or dead bodies. When the structure of civilization is rotten, it is always the masses that bring down its downfall (pg.19).

Thus, it is evident that Le Bon negatively characterized crowd, and viewed crowd action as destructive and barbaric. He held that the social formation of crowds hasten a breakdown of civilization. Ferdinand Tonnies offers some concepts on social formations which helps us understand how social formation is shaped by society and culture.

II Group Formation in Modern Society

Writing during Le Bon's era, Ferdinand Tonnies contributed much to the study of social formations of crowds in particular societies. He was concerned with the relationship between societal types and the way people relate and act collectively. Tonnies (1957) elaborated on the concept of two social formations, *Gemeinschaft*, which

means community, and *Gesellschaft*, which means association, "All intimate, private, and exclusive living together, so we discover, is understood as life in *Gemeinschaft* (community). *Gesellschaft* (society) is public life- it is the world itself" (pg. 33). A *Gemeinschaft* social formation emphasizes communal living and family-like relations. *Gesellschaft*, on the other hand, emphasizes the public life and the mechanical structure of society. It is important to note that Tonnies was born in Oldenswort, Germany in 1855 and died in 1936, a period characterized by increasing industrialization and the expansion of capitalism.

Giner argues that *Gemeinschaft* best describes pre-industrial society, while *Gesellschaft* best describes modern society. He believes that these concepts oppose one another, constituting two socially distinct poles. Upon the dialectical transformation of these two social poles, will we be able to understand societies. According to Giner, sociologists of the early twentieth century used this form of conceptualization to analyze social problems. Tonnies represents this sociological tradition.

Tonnies concept of social formations is significant in that he illuminated the preoccupation by many to explain the modern world and its processes. Due to capitalism and industrialization, the world has become more mechanical. Under a communal ethos, or *Gemeinschaft*, people are together

under an essential will, and under *Gesellschaft* people are together through the abstract will of a mechanical society. Under *Gesellschaft*, people are an "artificial construction of aggregate human beings," as Giner (1976) explains:

The separation bred and maintained by the *Gesellschaft* means opposition and competitiveness- the very conditions that make liberalism and individualism possible. But they also mean, Tonnies emphasized, the establishment of a common denominator for all men: atomization and complete equality. Thus, in the *Gesellschaft*, people are often not conceived as persons in particular but as simple units: thus...As Smith and Marx had pointed out, each person becomes a commodity (pg. 94).

According to Giner, Tonnies characterized the modern world as highly individualistic, and regarded individualism as an important characteristic of the modern industrialized world.

As previously noted, the individual in the mass society has no inner value or orientation except when it is provided by the mass. The individual yearns for a sense of direction. The individual is simultaneously looking for a community. According to the mass society theorist, in modern society there has been a breakdown of the community. As a result, the individual is left feeling empty and strives to be part of a community; mass society provides this sense of community. The process by which individuals are changed and become part of mass society is called

"massification." Giner (1976) explains this process:

Yet, if pressed for more precision it could be said that massification is seen as having different and complementary meanings. In the first place it means, in a subjective sense, that individuals feel more like each other, less individualized. They are "other directed," in Riesman's terminology because they do not draw their moral orientation from a higher system of values or from an inner sense of purpose: they are like empty shells looking for a sense of direction in the behaviors of others and in the flood of disorderly information provided by the media (pg. 126).

As Giner has explained, individuals in mass society become less of themselves, and receive direction from the mass. Individuals are drawn to mass society drawn to a mass society strive to be in a community. The mass society individual is isolated from modern society and from their culture. Thus, mass society individuals become passive objects, and as a result loose their individuality. As they are reified, they also become easy manipulated. Giner's (1976) citation of Heinrich Shirmbeck sums up the characteristics of individuals in a mass society: "The mass society is a sand-heap of individuals who are more dependent, impersonal, undifferentiated, isolated, uprooted, abandoned, communityless and more socially disintegrated than ever" (pg.190). Their conceptions and characterization of crowd action is partially shaped by their model of politics.

Mass society theorists believe in a pluralist model of

politics. They assume that society allows groups to express their grievances through institutional processes. Once their grievances are absorbed by the system, changes might occur in favor of that group. Therefore, groups have the freedom to voice their concerns but also have the ability to change reality, if they follow the rules of the system.

In the background of this pluralist model of politics, collective action is viewed as either institutional or non-institutional. Non-institutional collective action is performed by marginal members of society, and social protest is viewed as irrational. Margaret Mayer (1991) explains: "Because this assumed pluralist model of politics allows for rational pursuit of interests on the basis of decentralized channels of political articulation and access movements appear as superfluous and irrational"(pg.172). Many mass society theorists view crowd action as outside the social norm, irrational, non-political, and not within societal bounds. This view has been criticized by some historians who have offered alternative accounts of the polity and of crowd behavior.

In sum, some mass society theorists view collective action as an irrational response to such societal transformation as industrialization or urbanization. They view collective action as outside society's institutional norms, instead they stress the system's conventional

political processes, such as voting. According to mass society theorist, people engage in collective action because structural changes in society have made people frustrated, eventually this frustration leads to aggression, thus collective action. Others have different epistemologies on the nature of crowd action.

III The Critique by Historians: Collective Action vs. Normal Institutional Protest

A. E.P Thompson and the Moral Economy of the Crowd

E.P. Thompson in his article, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," presents a critique of the mass society perspective, which he has called the "spasmodic view of popular history." According to Thompson, some mass society theorists have reduced their explanations of collective action to economic terms. Instead of dealing with the complexities of public revolts, mass society theorists are satisfied with simple explanations. According to Thompson, some argued that increases in the prices of grain account for eighteenth century food riot⁴ Mass society theorists present the

⁴ He identified Charles Wilson's (1965) England's Apprenticeship, 1603-1703. Thompson said that others who adopted

actions of the masses as irrational. As the prior discussion indicated, mass society theorists view the masses as in a state of acute turbulence, whose actions are somewhat childlike. Thompson (1968) explains that for mass society theorists:

These intrusions are compulsive, rather than self-conscious or self-activating; they are simple responses to economic stimuli. It is sufficient to mention a bad harvest or a down-turn in trade, and all the requirements of historical explanation are satisfied (pg. 76).

Thus, according to Thompson, mass society theorists view the the actions of the masses not only as irrational but as a spasmodic response to an economic situation. Thompson argues that economic factors are not the only issue to consider in understanding collective action. Any study of collective action must account for the culture of the community as well as the history of the relationships of the community with authorities.

By studying eighteenth-century food riots in England, Thompson shows that the people who rioted were defending their usual rights, that the riot had objectives which they followed, and that economics cannot completely explain the event. Thompson revealed that in the food riots, which

the spasmodic view of popular history to explain food riots include R.F. Wearmouth (1945) in his book Methodism and the Common People of the Eighteenth Century and M. Beloff in his book Public Order and Popular Disturbances, 1660-1714.

occurred in the years 1709, 1740, 1756-57, 1766-67, 1773, 1782, 1795 and 1800-1801, in such counties as Lancashire, Yorkshire, Exeter, and Northumberland, there was a pattern of behavior which reflected the people's belief concerning what rights belong to them. For many years, the crowd was involved in the action of setting the price of bread. The price of the bread allowed for a specific standard of living, and when the price of bread was increased by millers, it disturbed this traditional standard of living. Although the economic factor was important, there were deeper issues present in the community. Thompson (1976) explains:

It is of course true that riots were triggered off by soaring prices, by malpractices among dealers, or by hunger. But these grievances operated within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and illegitimate practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc. This in its turn was grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic function of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the actual occasion for direct action (pg. 79).

Thus, as Thompson explains, the people had a conception of permissible practices by the authorities and business owners. It was this conception, which Thompson labels the moral economy, that the people defended. For Thompson, economics had a role in why the people rioted, but there was

also the issue of the community's conception of what traditional rights they were entitled to. People attacked the millers because they symbolized the disturbance of their traditional way of living. For Thompson, the eighteenth century food riot was a disciplined act, and the people had clear objectives, which were to defend the moral economy. Thompson rejects the mass society perspective which explains the event only as a response to economic stimuli, and which characterizes the people's action as irrational.

Can we use Thompson's moral economy to analyze American riots? Of course, Thompson studied a society in transition to capitalism and hence very different from ours in the 1960's, but some of the issues he stressed are important ones to consider in analyzing riots. He obliges us to identify the culture of the community that we embark on studying, and to discover the people's conception of what is acceptable behavior of authorities.

B. Charles Tilly and Popular Claim-Making

Both E.P. Thompson and Charles Tilly believe that the term "riot" is inaccurate in explaining popular events. Thompson argues that the term does not account for the discipline, history, and organization of the people, as he illustrated in eighteenth century food riots. As Tilly

(1996) asks:

What is a "riot" after all? just as the word "mob," "rabble," ...allow authorities, privileged classes, and other hostile observers to deny ordinary people standing as political actors, such as words "riot"... constitute deprecatory political labels for some kinds of popular claim making (pg. 230).

Popular claim making, according to Tilly (1996), are "commands, demands, requests, petitions, invitations, applications, supplications, that if realized affect other people's interest" (pg.228). For Tilly, popular claim making is at the root of popular politics. Tilly has also identified three elements that help us deal with the complexity of riots: social base, culture, and opportunity structure. Social base refers to the relations the participants have within the community setting. Culture refers to the shared meanings of the community. Opportunity refers to the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the possible action of the people.

In his chapter, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," Tilly (1979) further offers some terms to analyze riots, and makes some important remarks on collective action and civil society. For Tilly (1979), the "nature of violence and the character of routine social life intertwine" (pg.62). This is an important point to raise, for mass society theorists usually make the distinction that

collective action is not part of a peaceful civil society. Tilly argues, though, that collective action is an integral part of a peaceful society, and that groups make contentions to express their grievances. The repertoires of contention are the actions available to the group. According to Tilly (1979) collective action is "all concerted action that affects shared interests" (pg. 64).

Tilly argues against the view that it is a particular social stress that causes collective violence. From this point of view, collective action is a side-effect of urbanization and other modern problems. This view employs the mass society perspective. As Tilly (1979) explains:

A number of theories proposed to account for various forms of protest in contemporary nations, as well as in the Western historical experience, suggest a standard cycle: a relatively integrated society breaks up under the stress and movement of industrialization and urbanization, the stress and movement stimulate a wide variety of violent reactions- at first chaotic, but gradually acquiring a measure of coherence... In such a theory, the stimulus to collective violence comes largely from the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart. If misery or danger compounds the anxiety, runs the theory, the reaction becomes all the more violent. Thus, the way to mitigate violence is to reinforce social integration, reduce misery, and eliminate danger (pg. 68).

Tilly (1979) further comments that this is the dominant view employed by government and other institutions to explain mass action:

Not only scholars hold such a theory. It is our principal folk theory of social change. It reappears

almost every time ordinary Americans (or, for that matter, government commissions and professional journalists) discuss riots, or crime, or the divorce rate. It encourages the common illusion that highly mobile people and recent migrants to cities have greater inclinations to rioting, crime, or family instability than the general population. It encourages the dubious notion that if poor nations only become rich fast enough, they will also become politically stable. But the theory runs into trouble when it turns out that recent migrants are not, on the average, more disorganized than the rest of the population, that so-called rioters often come from longer-term residents of poor neighborhoods, and that the world's wealthiest nation are quite capable of domestic turmoil (pg. 68).

As Tilly says this explanation pervades the accounts by the media, newspaper, and the Governor's Commission which published a report about the Newark riot. Eugene Methvin in RiotMakers, for example, makes the argument that the rioters in Newark, New Jersey were displaced Southerners. He makes various references to the low education, and poverty conditions of those in the riot area. Methvin (1970) even called the rioters "human dregs" and described Newark as "all business district and urban slum" (pg. 24).

In his dissertation, Jeffery Paige challenged these assertions when he showed that the rioters were long term members of the community, employed, educated, and informed about the political issues of the city. In the next chapter, I will discussed Paige's study in depth.

There were other important issues raised in Tilly's article. He argued that collective action was directed

against those in power or the power relations of the community. In Newark, the needs of the African-American community were constantly shunned by the city and state administration. From Tilly's article I conclude that those involved in collective action, on the average, make claims of their right to be included in the political process of their lives. In addition, there is a sense of injustice in the community or a feeling that their rights are violated. In Newark, there were many instances of police brutality, an injustice that many African-American were weary of having to bear.

C. Natalie Zemon Davis and the Right to Violence

In her book, Society and Culture in Modern France, Natalie Zemon Davis has offered additional historical evidence on the organization and political elements of collective action by studying religious riots, presented in her essay, "The Rites of Violence." Noticing that little work has been devoted to religious riots, Davis studies sixteenth-century Catholic and Protestant riots. She argues that there is a shape and structure to these religious riots. Thus, Davis treats these riots as a "type of collective disturbance." She emphasizes the political aspects of the religious fights between the Protestants and

the Catholic.

Davis has revealed the political situations of these religious riots, that would normally be thought of as extreme and unorganized. As Davies (1975) points out, because authorities did not perform their duties, the people performed theirs:

Working from crowd behavior itself, I have merely stressed the fact that religious riot is likely to occur when it is believed that religious and/or political authorities are failing in their duties or need help in fulfilling them (pg. 169).

I hold that this concept can be applied to the Newark riots in that the crowd believed that the Addonizio administration and the police department were not protecting the people of the community. Thus, the Newark riot was partially a response to the police department's inability to deal with those police officers who abused their power.

Davis also supports the claim that there is always a particular disturbance which starts a riot. For example, in the case of the religious riots that Davis (1975) studied, there were specific incidents which dealt with the Catholic and Protestants' perceived violation of a sacred object or religious doctrine:

Almost every type of public religious event has a disturbance associated with it. The sight of a statue of the Virgin at a crossroad or in a wall-niche provokes a Protestant group to mockery of those who reverence her. A fight ensues. Catholics hide in a house to entrap Huguenots who refuse to doff their hats

to a Virgin nearby, and then rush out and beat up the heretics...Religious services: A Catholic mass is the occasion for an attack on the host or the interruption of a sermon, which then leads to a riot. Protestants preaching in a home attracts large Catholic crowd at the door, who stone the house or otherwise threaten the worshippers (pg. 170).

Davis showed that sometimes the Catholics viewed the Protestants as polluters and as the embodiment of evil. They thought that some Protestants were devils. When the religious or political authorities did not appropriately react to Protestant action that signified and symbolized evil to the Catholics, Catholics reacted in place of the religious and political authorities. Thus, Catholics rioted when they thought the authorities failed to carry out their responsibilities, as in the Catholic persecution of Huguenots, or protestants, in Provence and Meaux cities of France (Davis, 1978). In 1561, in Paris, a Catholic baker was killed for guarding the holy water (Davis, 1978). This event shows the importance of the concept of purity in the fights between the Protestants and the Catholics.

Davis not only supports the general claim that riots are started by a specific event, but she also showed that the actors were long time members of the community. Davis (1975) showed that those involved in the riot were "not the alienated rootless poor," but people such as lawyers, merchants, and artisans, not just people from the "lower

orders" were involved (pg. 182). I contend that this is the same situation as the Newark riots. Jeffery Paige has shown that those that were involved in the Newark riot were longtime members of the community.

VII Conclusion

In the beginning of this chapter, some of the important historical contributions that helped formulate the mass society perspective on collective action were discussed. There was a presentation of Le Bon's idea that individuals behave different in a crowd, and undergo the process of massification. When an individual is massified, the individual loses rationality and inner orientation as Giner noted. The discussion also covered Tonnies' concept of social formation, which obliges us to consider how people act collectively in certain societies. I have showed that mass society theorists fear the crowd. These historical contributions have helped create the mass society perspective. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen (1992) in Civil Society and Political Theory provide an explanation of the perspective as it stands today:

Collective-behavior theorists have focused on explaining individual participation in social movements, looking at grievances and value as responses to social change (strain) and social disorganization. Of course, not every theorist in this tradition deems

collective behavior to be an abnormal or irrational response of unconnected individuals to change. Nevertheless, they all view crowd as the simplest atom in the anatomy of collective behavior. All collective-behavior theorists stress the psychological reactions to breakdown, crude mode of communication, and volatile goals. This indicates an implicit bias toward regarding collective behavior as a nonrational or irrational response to change. It is this bias, most explicit in mass-society and Smelserian approaches, that has triggered the criticism of contemporary theorists. It is also this bias that precludes any examination of the relation between collective action and the modernization of civil society, for it presupposes from the outset that collective action derives from the breakdown (normative and institutional) of civil society (pg. 496).

Thus, the important issue for mass society theorists is the breakdown of civil society. The mass society perspective also views the individual as unconnected, and dismiss rational goals of the crowd. They also see the communication by the crowd as somewhat primitive.

The following chapter will show how this perspective and these notions, which reflect the mass society perspective, are embedded by the media, newspapers, and government agencies. The explanations offered by these institutions were not entirely within the mass society perspective, but it was the basis of their explanation. As their accounts often contradict one another, it is my goal to show precisely where this occurs. The following chapter also identifies aspects of the riot that were not explained by the media and the government.

Chapter 2

The 1967 Newark Riots: Mass Hysteria or Disciplined Act?

What follows is a critical day to day overview of the events, which occurred from Wednesday, July 13, 1967 to Monday, July 18, 1967, and a comparison of Methvin's account of the Newark riots with other studies. It will become evident that the participants of the riots had specific objectives and their actions were rational throughout the event. In addition to this, the riot was a response to the mistreatment and dehumanization that the African-American community has suffered since its forced entry in to the United States in the seventeenth century.

Wednesday, July 12, 1967: The Arrest of John Smith

On July 12, 1967, John Smith, an African-American cabdriver, drove around a double parked police car. He was stopped by the police and arrested for careless driving and resisting arrest. When arrested, Smith was struck with a blackjack, and taken to the Fourth Precinct police station.

While being driven to the police station, he was attacked by one of the police officers. The following is part of John Smith's testimony to the state government commission, also known as the Lilley Commission after its chairman Robert D. Lilley.⁵ In the state government report (1968), the following is reported about Mr. Smith's testimony:

On the way to the precinct, Mr. Smith stated, one of the policemen sitting in the front seat turned around and began to punch him. The policeman who was driving told his companion to stop. Mr. Smith quoted him as saying, "No, no, this baby is mine."

As a result of a particularly painful blow in the groin, Mr. Smith said, he was unable to walk out of the car to the police station. He said he was dragged out of the car and down the streets until the citizens observing protested.

Once in the station he was taken into a room by the arresting policemen, who, according to Mr. Smith, were joined, by seven or eight others, all of whom began kicking and beating him "for a lengthy period of time." He said he was dragged to a cell and the beating was continued. He said that a policeman threw water from a toilet bowl over him, and another-one of the arresting policemen- struck him in the head with a gun butt and in the right side with a blunt instrument (pg. 106).

According to the police report, Smith was arrested at 9:30 p.m. Soon after his arrest, civil rights leaders were at the precinct and a crowd began to gather outside of the fourth precinct. The civil right leaders demanded to see Smith, and this was granted by Inspector Melchior, who was the commander of the precinct at the time. After seeing

⁵ Appendix A is John Smith's testimony to the Government Commission.

Mr. Smith, the leaders requested that Smith be taken to the hospital because of the injuries he sustained. The Governor's Commission reports that he was taken to Beth Israel Hospital, where doctors reported that he suffered from internal bleeding in the skull and fractured ribs (Governor's Commission, 1968). After the hospital, Mr. Smith was taken to the downtown headquarters of the police station. While Smith was taken to the Hospital, a section of the community believed that he was beaten to death.

Some of the leaders present at the precinct included Robert Curvin from the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), and other groups such as the United Freedom Party, the Newark Community Union Project, and the Newark Legal Services project were also at the precinct. The significance of the presence of these groups is that despite the witnesses from the Hayes Homes projects, had Smith not been taken to the hospital where his injuries were documented, it probably would have been difficult to substantiate the claim that he was brutalized.

However, Eugene Methvin and the police officers provided a different account of what happened. According to Methvin and the two police officers who arrested Smith, John DeSimone and Vito Pontrelli, Smith tailgated the police car and flicked his high beams many times. When the officers stopped Smith and asked for his license and registration,

Smith attacked Officer DeSimone, hitting him "full in the face and bloodying his lip" (Methvin, 1970). The following is a portion of the testimony given to the Governor's Commission⁶:

The two policemen pursued the cab to South Ninth Street, where they stopped it. They reported that, when the driver was asked for his license and registration certificate, he answered with insults and curses. When Mr. DeSimone told the driver he was going to arrest him, Mr. Smith responded by opening his car door, striking Mr. DeSimone in the chest and then punching him in the face. Mr. Pontrelli came to his colleague's aid and, after a struggle Mr. Smith was subdued and placed in the patrol car.

After calling another patrol car to tow the taxi, Patrolmen 42 started for the Fourth Precinct. En route, the two policemen said, the prisoner became violent, fought with Mr. DeSimone, and struck Mr. Pontrelli, who was driving.

At the precinct, the two policemen testified, Mr. Smith refused to leave the car and they pulled him out, but he refused to walk. Each policeman then took an arm of Mr. Smith's feet and the three carried him to the precinct. Just before entering the building, Patrolman Pontrelli said Mr. Smith again became violent (pg. 105).

There are some areas of this testimony which immediately warrant some further questions. For example, was Mr. Smith told why he was going to be arrested? Why would Mr. Smith initially answer the officers with insults and curses? Why would Mr. Smith, an African-American man living in the 1960's, tailgate a cop car? According to the testimony, Mr. Smith became hostile solely upon the officers request for

⁶ Appendix B is the testimony the officers provided in the report to the Governor's Commission

his documents, and without any dialogue with the police. It seems from the officer's testimony that Mr. Smith's anger did not gradually increase but that it was there from the beginning. According to the testimony, Mr. Smith attacked the officers while being arrested and taken to the precinct. Why would a sober person attack two armed police officers? In addition, the officers did not explain how Mr. Smith managed to attack them while he was handcuffed.

The Governor's report provides more evidence to support Smith's account. As mentioned above, the medical report showed that Smith's ribs were caved in, explaining why he was not able to walk from the car to the precinct. Beyond this, witnesses testified that the police officers continually attacked Smith while he was taken to the precinct.

At 11 p.m., the previously mentioned organizations held a protest between the Fourth Precinct and the Hayes Homes project. According to Tom Hayden, an organizer for the SDS, there were approximately 100 people in front of the precinct, but the crowd was getting larger. At 11:30 p.m., young men from the Hayes Homes Project began to fire bottles and rocks at the precinct. The police came outside with helmets and clubs but were unable to handle the situation. At midnight, two Molotov cocktails were fired at the precinct. The crowd grew to about 500 and people began to

retreat into Hayes Homes project. Hayden (1967) reports that young men, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five years old, were the ones who started the rock and bottle throwing, but were soon joined by others:

So while the young men grouped their forces, shouted and armed themselves against the helmeted police with whatever they could find on the ground, the older generation gathered in greater and greater numbers in the rear (pg. 17).

This is the first time the crowd had a confrontation with the police. The confrontation continued until about 2:30 a.m. Around 12:45 a.m., young men looted stores on 17th Avenue. Some of the businesses that were looted were liquor stores and furniture stores, but stores which sold electronic appliances were also looted, such as "Harry's Store" on 17th street. According to Hayden, these stores were owned by whites who did not live in the community. As the young men attacked stores, people from the project began to enter them and take items from the store. An abandoned car was set ablaze outside the precinct, and while the policemen and firemen dealt with the fire, they were attacked by stones (Georges, 1974). At this stage of the riot, the police began to patrol the area in teams, but they were outnumbered and unfamiliar of the terrain. Hayden (1967) comments on the geographical advantage that the crowd had:

The Hayes project are a useful terrain for people making war. The police station is well lit, but the projects are dark, especially the rooftops a hundred yards above the street. Each room in the projects can be darkened to allow people to observe or attack from their windows. There is little light in the pathways, recreation areas, and parking lots around the foot of the tall buildings. The police thus were faced with the twin dangers of ambush and searching through a shadow world where everybody and everything appears to be alike. It was in this sanctuary that parents came together. It was here also that their sons could return to avoid the police. (pg. 18).

According to Hayden, some of the older generation of African-Americans united with the younger generation because many believed that the actions of the young were an appropriate response to police brutality and racism. Hayden also points out that this is an anomaly, for the older generation of African-American parents usually disagreed with the more "radical" younger generation.

The event, so far, had centered on the Hayes Homes project and the Fourth precinct. But between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. cab cars were lined up on the corner of 17th Street. The African-Americans cab drivers communicated through C.B. radios and at 3:00 a.m., they went down to police headquarters where John Smith was held by police and demanded his release. The police promised that Smith would be treated well and released in the morning. In the other section of the riot-area, police patrolled 17th street and by 4:00 a.m. most people went home. By 5 a.m. Hayden

reports that the police were the only ones on the street (Hayden, 1967). The events that transpired on Wednesday, July 13, 1967 do not differ fundamentally among many existing accounts. The differences mainly lie on the time of each of the occurrences. What is significant about these events is that the people were organized, and that they peacefully assembled in City Hall and the Fourth precinct. They even communicated with C.B. radios about the beating of John Smith. The young men who looted stores targeted stores whose merchant "ripped off" the community by engaging in such practices as using illegitimate scales or scales that were not properly balanced (Hayden, 1967)⁷. It seems evident that the people knew what they were doing. Their goal was not only to protest police brutality, but to attack the businesses that used practices that were unfavorable to the people. As Hayden (1967) explains :

⁷ The author has studied the federal government's account of the Newark riot in The U.S. National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorder, the state government's account of the Newark riot in Report for Action: The Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders, , various magazines and newspapers, and dissertations. Tom Hayden in his book, The Rebellion Newark, is the only one that provides evidence which suggests that the store owners used illegal practices to "rip off" the people of the community. Hayden is also the only one that has spent time living in the area. At the time he was an organizer for the SDS, and thus he was able to have personal interaction with many people in the community. I would argue that this allowed him to discover the practices of the store owners.

For the most part the rioting was controlled and focused. The "rampaging" was aimed almost exclusively at white-owned stores, and not at such buildings as schools, churches, and banks. The latter institutions are oppressive but their buildings contain little that can be carried off. To this extent the riot was concrete rather than symbolic. There were no attacks by Negroes on "soul brother" stores. There were people injured by glass on the streets where they fell, but they typically fell because police chased them, not because of stampeding into each other in the rush for goods (pg. 33).

What Hayden's account suggests is that the people had specific targets, and their actions were organized. Hayden's accounts provides a background to better understand the people's action. The issue of whether or not the people's actions are justified is not taken up by Hayden or this thesis. What I attempt to show is that the accounts given by Methvin, the media, and the government, which use the mass society perspective, disregard many important aspects of the people's action. In addition, I attempt to show a possible framework for understanding the actions of the people. I have illuminated the issue of the federal, state, and city governments' continuing disregard of the needs of the community. In addition, there were many cases of police brutality in Newark that the people suffered, but little had been done by the existing governmental bodies to deal with problem. There are two articles that help us better understand the people's actions.

In the August 11, 1967 issue of Commonweal, Ralph

Whitehead described some of the circumstances surrounding the riots. According to Whitehead, Addonizio became mayor of Newark in 1962 in part because of African-American support. He notes that one third of the votes were African-American votes. In 1966, however, Addonizio abandoned the African-American votes and attempted to win with White votes. Whitehead believes that Addonizio wanted to "exploit White backlash." Another historical circumstance that Whitehead accounted for was the population change in the city. Whitehead says that in 1950 there were 75,000 African-Americans, but by 1960, the number had increased to 150,000. At the same time that Blacks moved into the city, whites and businesses moved out to the suburbs. What is important about Whitehead's account is that it provides a background to understand the African-American need for political representation and control of the city.

Lewis Moroze's article "Lethal Indifference" attests to the Addonizio administration ignoring the demands and needs of African-American community. One issue that Moroze argues was a factor in the riots was the decision of the Mayor to bring to the city a new medical school and hospital. The Mayor argued that the school would create more jobs for the city residents and revitalize the area. The school, however, would displace thousands of Black city residents who would be made homeless to provide the 150

acres of land needed by the medical school. Addonizio did not provide homes for those African-Americans who would lose their homes to the medical school.

Another major decision that Moroze cites as the administration disregarding the needs of the African-Americans in the city was the appointment of a white over an African-American accountant as Secretary of the Newark Board of Education at a time when 76% of the students were nonwhite (Moroze, 1967). In addition to these decisions, the Mayor received demands to create a Civilian Review Board to investigate charges of police brutality and initially did nothing about it. The demand to review police brutality is not unique to Addonizio's administration. In 1952, Governor Driscoll received a demand to take action on police brutality and murder and he ignored it.

Moroze's account of the etiology of the riots differs greatly from the prevailing views of the riots. He argues that those who rioted attacked places that were symbols and reminders of oppression. The first place attacked was the Fourth Police Precinct, John Smith, a cab driver, was harassed and attacked by police. Moroze (1967) reports that along with the police, white businesses represented symbols of oppression:

During the riots snipers appeared, shooting more to harass than to kill; they shot at the hated policemen, but firemen were also targets, guaranteeing the burning

of the two symbols of their degradation- white businesses and rat-infested tenements (pg.106).

Thus, for Moroze, white businesses and the police represented the symbols that reminded the people of their constant disregard by the government. Moroze's article demonstrate that the riot can only be understood in its historical context. Explanations of the riots need to account for the political history of the African-American in Newark. Some newspaper accounts make little or no reference to what happened in the past.

The incident with the cab driver being attacked by the police reveals a historical irony. Moroze (1967) quotes from a report published in 1961 by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission the national occurrence of police brutality:

In 1931 President Hoover's Wickersham Committee found extensive evidence of police lawlessness including unjustified violence. Sixteen years later another Presidential Committee, this one appointed by President Truman, concluded that police brutality, especially against the unpopular, the weak and the defenseless was a distressing problem. And now in 1961 this Commission must report that police brutality is still a serious problem throughout the United States (pg. 106).

Thus, the issue of police brutality is one that was prevalent in the United States against the weak and who was weaker in American cities than African-American? Moroze's account provides challenges others to account for history.

U.S. News and World Report published two short articles on the riots on July 24, 1967 and July 31, 1967. In the July 24 article, some of the statistics included were that there were 2,000 National Guardsmen, 300 state troopers, and 1,400 Newark police officers at the scene. The article views the riots as a race war and it cites "highly inflammatory language" from African-American residents. In addition to this the July 24 article (1967) focuses mainly on the action of those that rioted, especially in the beginning of the article:

The biggest riot since 1965 turned into a virtual race war in the streets of this city where more than half the residents are Negroes. Shouting "Kill white devils," Negroes by the **thousands** rampaged through the downtown section, smashing windows, setting fires, looting stores and attacking the police. Negroes bombarded the police with rocks, bottles, and even barrels. Snipers fired from rooftops, Casualties ran into the hundreds. Property damage was in the millions of dollars. Virtually every store along 12 blocks of a major avenue was looted (pg. 6).

Another quote from African-American residents included was one man saying, "I'd like to get me a white man and cut out his heart. I'm not making this up, babe." According to the article one white man who was going through the riots was stopped and beaten by rioters. As to the causes of the riots, the article partly blames H. Rap Brown from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Stokely Carmichael from the Black Power movement. The article

treats them as agitators and described the SNCC as a "militant Negro organization."

In the second article of July 31, 1967, just seven days later, the number of guardsmen increased to 3,000 as opposed to the July 24, 1967 number of 2,000. According to this second article there were 25 deaths, 1,100 plus injured, 1,300 arrests, and \$15 million in property damage. The article also states that in 1960 the "Negro" population was 35 percent and in 1967 more than 50 percent.

The article continues by citing more statistics on the social conditions of the city that might help explain the causes of the riot, such as a 7 percent unemployment rate, the highest percent of substandard housing in the nation, highest crime per 100 thousand population, high rates of venereal diseases, and high property tax.

Before continuing, it is necessary to point out some inaccuracies in the account given by Methvin's view on what happened on Wednesday, July 13. According to Methvin, 1200 people were outside the Fourth Precinct "within minutes" of the arrest. This is disproved by the Governor's report and various studies on the riots. The state government has no such total for the number of people outside of the precinct. The highest figure indicated by the report during the entire day was 250. Hayden reports that in the critical moments of the confrontation between the people and the police the

crowd was as large as 500. Methvin also reports that the people attacked and "stoned" firemen. On this day there was no such activity. The Fire Department was not involved until the later stages of the riot.

Thursday July 13, 1967 The Crowd's Objectives and
Confrontation with Law Enforcement

At 6 p.m. people in the community passed out fliers, which said "Stop Police Brutality," announcing a protest at 7:30 p.m. at the Fourth Precinct. The organizing of the protest occurred in the parking lot area of the Hayes Home project. Al Black, the chairman of the Newark Human Rights Commission, was there. Between 7:30 p.m. and midnight, the crowd increased, and word was spreading about the protest. According to the Governor's report (1968) 300 people were outside the precinct around 7 p.m. Between 7 and 7:30 that James Threatt from city administration announced to the crowd that a "Negro police officer was being promoted to captain" (pg.113). While he spoke, people from the Hayes Homes project began to throw rocks and items at the police station. About 15 minutes later, 50 officers with helmets and riot gear exited the precinct. The crowd dispersed through the area. The officers called for more reinforcement and while they were taking control of this

area, activities on Springfield Avenue were increasingly becoming intense. At this point the police's goal was to contain the areas attacked by the people and to attempt to protect businesses.

At midnight there was heavy looting on Springfield Avenue. According to Hayden, thousands of people in the streets looted stores. According to Hayedn, they looted stores that ripped them off ⁸:

People voted with their feet to expropriate property to which they felt entitled. They were tearing up the stores with trick contracts and installment plans, the second-hand television sets going for top quality prices, the phony scales, the inferior meat and vegetables (pg. 30).

The people had a clear objective and Hayden's description provides evidence that the people had specific targets and knew what they were doing. Evidently the people were not destroying their own neighborhood, instead they targeted businesses owned by people that did not live in their neighborhood. The organization of the riot was not accounted by the media.

Friday, July 14, 1967 National Guard and State Troopers

The National Guard and State troopers arrived in Newark

⁸ I have previously mentioned that Hayden is the only author that accounts for these practices.

on Friday morning. According to the Governor's Commission, the state troopers numbered 500, while the National Guardsmen reached 3,000. This was in addition to the 1400 Newark police officers who were already dealing with the looting, burning, and confrontations with the people. These law enforcement units were stationed in the corners of streets the people passed through, and in places where they might have gone. As a result of the police presence, the looting and burning decreased, and by Friday it happened only sporadically.

Governor Hughes called for the State Troopers and National Guards at 2:45 a.m. and they arrived in Newark at 4:30 a.m. According to the state government report, the police department, troopers, and guardsmen operated from the Roseville Armory. It was not until 5:30 a.m. that the force began to patrol the vulnerable areas of the riot. Despite their attempts to have a coordinated effort to deal with the riots, the city, state, and national forces were unable to confront the situation together, partly because they were unable to communicate on the same radio frequency. Each force used a different frequency. In addition, state troopers were unfamiliar with the area and did not receive necessary information from the Newark Police Department which precluded them to be familiar with the area, as the Governor's Commission (1968) pointed out:

Another problem for the State police was its inability during the early phase of its involvement to obtain a clear definition of the riot perimeter, or even a statement of where activity was heaviest. The Newark Police could not supply maps of the city. Eventually, Colonel Kelly found some maps and learned from the Newark police that Springfield Avenue was the major problem (pg. 117).

In addition to communication problems, the state government reports that the law enforcement officials were having difficulties deciding who was in command. Major Addonizio testified that at times he did not feel included in the discussions held by state troopers and national guardsmen.

Governor Hughes along with other officials toured the area of the riot from 8:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. Meanwhile, he banned the selling of alcohol and weapons, and banned vehicles from the area. By 2:30 p.m., the state troopers, Newark police, and the guardsmen patrolled and guarded various intersections of the area. By this time there were 600 state troopers, and 3,464 guardsmen (Governor's Commission, 1968). Most deaths occurred during the time that law enforcement units were present, which was Friday. In addition, 63% of the total arrests were made on Friday (Governor's Commission, 1968). According to the Commission, 906 out of the 1,465 arrests were made on Friday, and 14 out of the 26 total deaths were on Friday.

According to Tom Hayden, these officers, who were there to guard the area and make it safer for the community, began

to harass, arrest, attack, and kill innocent people of the community. There were many incidents documented by the state government which show that the officers mistreated the people. Among them included by the Governor's Commission (1968) was the testimony of Janie Carter that on Friday:

They didn't say a thing. They just started beating people with the sticks and some had guns and they were shooting in other directions from where I was. So I started to run across the street, but when I looked back, one grabbed Mrs. Jimenez from the back of her head, pushed her down and started beating her, and the others were beating her (pg. 118).

These and other testimonies indicate the disregard by law enforcement officials for the well-being of the people of the community: Oliver Bartlett testified that when he was at the train station, officials harassed him by stopping him and searching him in public. He commented the following to the Governor's Commission (1968):

Everybody there were people that owned homes and had some sort of responsibility to the law. It seemed this didn't work. They kept on pushing and acting like we were dogs. We had no kind of respect. They can't say "Please Move" (pg 119).

The state government concluded that law enforcement official's conduct was hostile toward the community. Considering that they were unfamiliar with the territory, were initially unable to communicate, were all white, and were unsure about what they were fighting, it is safe to

conclude that they probably mistreated many people in the community. These aspects of the riots were not covered in the media. The government documents provided evidence supporting the charge that law enforcement officials were hostile toward the community.

Saturday, Sunday, and Monday The Retrieval by Law Enforcement

The last days of the riot were quiet. People began to deal with the property damage, the deaths, and the many arrests that were made. It was also during these days that according to testimony, National Guardsmen looted and damaged places owned by African-Americans. The area was mostly empty, but, on the excuse that they were looking for snipers they were able to destroy the community further. According to the state government, there were many incidents of misconduct by law enforcement.⁹ The state government report included testimony by many people of the community

⁹ Some of the incidents of police misconduct documented by the Commission were currently being investigated by the State Police and the Newark Police Department. Other incidents were never processed by these agencies because, according to them, the incidents were not strong enough to warrant a full investigation. The Commission reported there existed no grand jury investigation on the incidents that the Commission documented. One of the conclusions that the Commission made was that some police officers and National Guardsmen abused their powers.

who had their businesses damaged by law enforcement officials. Among the most striking was the testimony by Mrs. Enez-King, an owner of a dry-cleaning establishment, who told the Governor's Commission (1968) that at 3 a.m. on Sunday:

When we heard the glass break, we got up to look out the window. They took the clothes with the butts of their guns , knocked them off the rack and just went around knocking things around... By accident they hit (the cash register). They opened it. One came over and took the money, and then they looked around and words were saying" There is nothing left here lets go (pg. 121)."

Despite the clear testimony provided in the report, there was no evidence that pointed to any compensation for what the people suffered by the actions of law enforcement officials. On Monday, the restrictions on traffic were lifted but the selling of weapons and alcohol was still prohibited. According to the report, there were \$10 million in property damage, 26 deaths, and about 1,000 injured. One interesting point made by Daniel Georges (1974) in his P.h.D dissertation was that some police reports showed charges that are unusual in a riot such as glue sniffing and unlicensed driving (pg.118). Georges provides evidence for inappropriate behavior of law enforcement.

Existing Accounts of the Riots

One interpretation of the 1967 Newark riots was given by Tom Hayden. Hayden was accused by Methvin and other people in the media of being one of the "agitators" of the riots. In 1964, Tom Hayden was one of the leaders of the Student for a Democratic Society. Those that accuse him of being a militant use this prior background in organization as evidence. Methvin portrays Hayden as one of many people who planted the "seed of violence" in the community. The fact that he was involved in the community can be viewed as either positive or negative.

According to Hayden, the riot was a response to the persistent social conditions of the community. It was a response to dilapidated housing, crime, and high unemployment, in addition to the Addonizio administration's exclusion of African-American from political empowerment and opportunity to change the community.

He argues that in the riot, law enforcement was a threat to the people of the community instead of protection. Most of the deaths and arrests occurred on Friday, the day law enforcement from all levels of government patrolled the streets. Hayden reported that the state troopers looted and destroyed those stores that had "Soul Brother" signs. Descriptions of such actions by law enforcement officials also appear in the state government report and in the residents' testimonies. What is evident, then, is that the

police were involved in illegal activities, and were not portrayed by the media as so unorganized and careless as they sometimes were. In contrast, the organization of the people was not accounted in the media's account.

Some of Hayden's points were substantiated by Jeffery Paige's P.h.D dissertation on the Newark riots. According to Paige, the people in the community rejected what he called the culture of subordination. The people resented exclusion from the political control of their lives. This culture of subordination was a culture where African-Americans were thought of as inferior and subordinate to Whites. For Paige, the rioters rejected this culture. Paige shows through the surveys he conducted that many of those involved in the riot were proud to be Black, and were employed. He also found that they were very informed about the politics of their surroundings.

Paige surveyed 236 African-American males between the ages of 15-35, and categorized them as rioters or non-rioters. Paige conducted his study January and February of 1968, six months after the Newark riot. He used tracts from the 1960 census. The males he surveyed were from the Central Ward and the study covered an area of 29 blocks (pg. 15). Out of 340 attempts, Paige managed to survey 236 males or 69% of the population.

He charges the state government's report with mistakenly treating those who rioted as deviants, and as riffraff with no purpose in rioting. Paige argues that this view is mistaken for many of the people who were involved were not only employed but were stable members of the community. Many lived there for at least a decade. He also shows how they were also educated. Hayden and Paige contend that the people that rioted had a political and social purpose, and this was to communicate to the city administration that they wanted political control.

For Paige (1967), the people attempted to set a new relationship between Whites and African-Americans and the riot was a "reaction to the norms of racial subordination" (pg. 11). Through the surveys Paige conducted, he showed that those that rioted had high self-respect, rejected the culture of subordination, and were well informed about the politics of the city and the community.

Paige in his study has discredited the riffraff or mass society interpretation of the riot. According to these interpretations, those who rioted were at lowest economic level of the community. This was not so, for many were employed. Paige (1967) also tested the Kornhausel model of radical movements (pg. 137). According to this interpretation, derived from Durkheim, those who rioted had little or no relationship with groups of the community.

Paige showed that those who rioted were not alienated from the community, but, on the contrary, had been core members of the community:

Finally, the relationship of rioters to the political system could have been one of indifference or ignorance. The Kornhauser model of radical movements suggests that the rioters should be disproportionately recruited from those with few organizational ties in the Negro community. There was no evidence that rioters were found among those with no ties to secondary group, although there was a distinct decrease in riot participation at the highest levels of organizational membership (pg. 137).

Paige contradicts both the mass society theory of urban riots and the Kornhausel model because he showed through his surveys that those who rioted were not foreigners to the community.

Conclusion

Both Paige and Hayden have challenged the mass society perspective of urban riots. Applying this perspective to the 1967 Newark riots reveals that it is an inaccurate interpretation of the riot. Methvin and the media argue that agitators such as Stokely Carmichael and Tom Hayden provided the community with the idea to revolt against authorities. Methvin specifically argued that the people wanted to fight the police and used tactics to "bait" the police. According to Methvin, those who rioted were very

poor and alienated from the community. The riot is represented as chaotic and without merit. Hayden shows how the people were organized and targeted specific stores. Snipers did not shoot police officers but shot in the air to slow down the police. People targeted stores that used illegal practices. Paige shows how the rioters were employed, were educated, and were core members of the community.

It is outside of the scope of this paper to discuss the effects of the Newark riot on the city of Newark. This will be an issue taken up by the researcher in future projects. In this paper, the researcher wants to illuminate some important aspects of the riots that were dismissed and disregarded by the dominant view of the Newark riots.

Chapter 3

An Analysis of Discourse on The Riots

This chapter contains an analysis of the discourse used in the newspapers, magazines, and governmental documents, highlighting images and concepts that were used to report and account for what occurred in Newark between Wednesday, July 13, 1967 to Monday July 20, 1967. As previously mentioned, Moroze and Whitehead have illuminated two key issues that helped explain the social conditions of the African-American community. One was the continued incidents of brutality by law enforcement officials. There was a legacy of police abusing their powers in dealing with many African-Americans, as the Governor's Commission concluded. The community attempted many times to communicate to governmental officials at the local, state, and federal level that something needed to be done about police brutality. Despite these efforts, police brutality continued and the incident with John Smith was just another event added to the list.

The second issue was the city administration's disregard for the needs and aspirations of the African-American community. Two examples that illustrate this point are the creation of a new medical school in the Central

Ward, and Major Addonizio's selection of a White man to become the Secretary of the Board of Education. These are two main themes that we see in the articles and the government documents.

In this chapter, I illustrate the basic explanation offered by the some of the legitimators of truth in American discourse¹⁰: The New York Times, U.S. News and World Report, Time, the Star Ledger, and the reports given by the state and federal government documents. Although there are some divergent claims and views about the riot, there is an underlying notion of the cause of the riot, and it is full of mass society terms and images.

Another component in their use of mass society concepts and images is the racialization of the African-American. This racialization of African-Americans as criminals and deviants helped many Whites to adopt mass society images of the riots. The last section of this chapter deals with what some Whites who were around the area believe and remember about the riots. One central point that was persistent in the media's account and the account of these witnesses is

¹⁰ I do not agree that there is a one way medium in American discourse, where information is disseminated from the media to the public. I believe that there are always resistance and alternative discourses, as Foucault argued. But I would also argue that the discourse in "popular" media reflects the views and ideological perspective of the dominant economic class in America, even as it shapes and reinforces them.

the fear of the masses and their characterization of crowd behavior.

II The Media's Account of the Riots

A. Newspapers

One of the many important articles written that allows us to analyze governmental and media discourse was published on July 15, 1967 in the Newark Star Ledger, entitled "Hughes: A City in Open Rebellion." In this article Governor Hughes was quoted as saying that there was a "level of anarchy" that existed at the time. While on tour of the Springfield Avenue area, one of the main streets where the riot occurred, with the Prosecutor of Essex County Brendan Byrne, the Governor made various remarks which reflect his strong feeling in maintaining "order." He believed that the rebellion was both "anarchy" and a "criminal insurrection." The following statement quoted in the July 15 edition of the Star Ledger (1967) illustrates his emphasis on normal institutional collective action, and the need to maintain a normally peaceful civil society, two fundamental tenets of the mass society theory:

No one really wants to offend anyone's constitutional right but the life of this city and in a real sense the country depends on someone drawing the line between

reasonable and lawful excuses and civil rights, such as picketing and boycotts, and the type of criminality- and it is not too much to say rampant anarchy- which occurred in Newark last night (pg.1).

The governor's perspective on the rebellion helps us understand his actions. He called the National Guard and committed the State Police to the Newark area. In addition, there were also the entire Newark Police Department on duty, which numbered about 1,400. Thus the forces committed to the area were of considerable strength. One interesting point in this article was that the Governor stated that he would have an attorney available to everyone who was arrested, but his tone changed toward the end of the article. According to the July 15 edition of the Star Ledger, he said that the rebellion was a "criminal insurrection against society- hiding out behind the shield of civil rights" (page.2).

In another article in the July 15 edition of the Star Ledger (1967), entitled "More Sniping, Looting: Fire Captain Slain, Toll Reaches 20," the authors implied that the amount of police officers who were present was necessary to deal with those who were armed. They called these individuals "deadly scattered snipers." The police dealt with the situation by patrolling a ten square mile area whose main streets included 17th and 18th street and Springfield Avenue. Key aspects of this article were the statements

made by Addonizio, who for the first time is quoted saying that outside "agitators" were to be partially blamed for the event:

Addonizio who until yesterday afternoon said he did not believe the riot was organized, said that he now felt elements from out of town were helping to promote the disturbance (pg.3).

One of these outside elements was Stokely Carmichael, and there was an adjoining article which dealt with his participation in the riot. According to the article, Stokely Carmichael took a plane from Kennedy airport to London on Friday, July 14, 1967. He was asked about his participation in the riots and he responded that he did not participate in the riot and that he had not been in Newark. Mr. Carmichael was introduced as a "controversial Negro Leader" and as ex-chairperson of the SNCC. Methvin also believed that there were outside agitators, and included in his list Tom Hayden from SDS and Robert Curvin from the Congress on Racial Equality. As discussed in the last chapter, both Georges and Paige disproved the idea that the people involved were from outside of the community.

The event was represented as chaotic and crowd behavior characterized as if the crowd was in an "acute state of turbulence," which was Le Bon's notion of the crowd. The state represents the environment of the riot as barbaric and opposite civilized life. The state's use of massive law

enforcement is justified to maintain "order" in the Central Ward, which was mostly populated by African Americans. Nathan Wright Jr, in his book Ready to Riot, pointed out that geographically the Central Ward was the most dilapidated area of the city, and the other ward created a shield around the area . Thus it was known to many that the Central Ward was mostly African-American, and this demographic condition helped create negative images of the riot area. At the time of the riot, 50 percent of the city's population was African-American, and many lived in the Central Ward. In the July 15 edition of the New York Times (1967), in an article entitled "Curfew Imposed on City; Sniper Slays Policeman," Maurice Carroll quoted Governor Hughes' description of Newark as a jungle:

At 10 P.M. curfew was imposed after Governor Hughes, taking personal charge of the riot-control operation, said his state's largest city was in a state of "open rebellion."

"The line between the jungle and the law might as well be drawn here as well as any place in America," Governor Hughes said.

The violence, after abating slightly earlier in the day, intensified toward evening. The city's entire police force, hundreds of state troopers, and thousands of National Guardsmen sealed off one third of city and fought pitched and running battles to throttle the fury (pg. 1).

Referring to the city as a jungle reflects racial notions about Blacks as uncivilized and barbaric. The Governor's comments closely resembles Le Bon's notion of the crowd as

stupid and barbaric. The idea of the jungle is closely related to the racist concepts of African-Americans in this country. The jungle reminds many people of Africa and uncivilized life. These are the kinds of notions that were used to describe Newark- that the event was total chaos, that people were burning down their own communities. It was represented as something rational people would not do. The Governor's comments reflect these aforementioned assumptions. It is easier to accept mass society theory because of the racist assumptions made against African-Americans and vice-versa.

What is significant is not only the Governor calling the city a jungle, but also the journalist's description of the law enforcement officials fighting a "real war," as if the people they were fighting against were numerous and heavily armed. As Hayden noted, a very small section of the community had guns, and their stated objective was not to shoot cops but to stall them by shooting in the air. Yet, the journalist treated these events as an anomalous event disturbing peace instead as a "critique of the social order," as Skurski and Coronil (1991) described some collective action (pg. 328).

B.Magazines

The discussion on the newspaper account has been brief. In this section I illuminate articles that employ mass society analysis in more detail. In a Time article entitled "Sparks and Tinder," we see the distortion of reality that the magazine employed. The author added ideas and a background story which implied that the police officers were doing their jobs. There are many instances where the newspapers and the media through their story telling legitimize the actions of the state. In chapter 2, I recalled the testimony given by John Smith, and the police officers. I also showed how the medical reports and the Governor's Commission provide more proof for Smith's account. That account can be contrasted with the following report in July 21 edition of Time (1967) to show how the media justified the actions of the state:

Smith was driving his cab through winding, brick-paved streets in Newark just after dusk one evening. Ahead of him, moving at a maddeningly slow pace, was a prowler car manned by Officers John DeSimone and Vito Pontrelli, on the lookout for traffic violators, and the angry brawls that often mar a summer's night in a Negro neighborhood. In the stifling heat, Smith grew impatient and imprudent. Alternately braking and accelerating, flicking his headlights on and off, Smith tailgated the police car. Finally, after a quarter mile of tailgating, Smith tried to swing past the police. They cut him off. "Who the hell?...Goddam...Son of a Bitch! There was a short scuffle, and Smith was trundled into the squad car (pg.15).

The above report supports two basic racist assumptions.

The first assumption is that African-Americans are

inherently inferior. This is reflected when the author says that traffic violators and brawls should be expected on a summer night in an African-American community. I am not arguing that traffic violations and brawls do not occur, but that it is racist to assume that it is more likely to happen in an African-American community than any other working class community.

The second racist assumption is that African-Americans lack the human capacity to communicate. This reflects itself when the author supposedly quoted John Smith as screaming offensive comments to the police officers. That African-Americans are incapable of communicating is a racist assumption about African-Americans closely related to their supposed barbaric nature. Hughes' description of the area as the jungle goes along with notions of African-Americans as criminals, irrational, and a threat to peaceful civil life.

In addition to racist assumptions embedded in the text, the author does not account for the medical report, which showed that Smith had broken ribs and fractured skull. Beyond this empirical evidence, I have already identified questions that are not answered in this account. For example, why would Smith tailgate a police car? Why would he be very aggressive with armed police officers? In addition to these questions, one notices that the article adds these

images to the event which justify the actions of the police officers. The author added that it was hot that day and this is why Smith "grew impatient." In addition, the author never said that Smith hit the police officers, and explains why he was arrested.

U.S. News and World Report best illustrates the racialization and the fear of the African-American subject in the article "Newark Race Riot: Open Rebellion-Just like Wartime," published on July 24, 1967. Again what is evident is the fear of the mass and the over-exaggeration of crowd behavior that lies at the forefront. The article characterizes crowd behavior as a real threat to the police and to society. It is also important to note how the article starts by describing the actions of the rioters first, for this structure seems to help to instill fear in the mind of the reader. What follows are the opening sentences of the article of the July 24, 1967 article:

The biggest riot since 1965 turned into a virtual race war in the streets of this city where more than half the residents are Negroes. Shouting "Kill White Devils," Negroes by the thousands rampaged through the downtown section, smashing windows, setting fires, looting stores, and attacking the police. Negroes bombarded police with rocks, bottles, even barrels. Snipers fired from rooftops. Casualties ran into the hundreds. Virtually every store along 12 blocks of a major avenue was looted. Property damage was in the millions of dollars. Violence first erupted July 12, triggered apparently by Negro charges of police brutality in arresting a Negro (pg.6).

The idea that African-Americans were "rampaging" through the streets screaming "Kill White Devils" is one that instills fears in many White Americans. And this fear in turn justifies the state's massive law enforcement unit. In justifying the state's repressive measures, it is important for the media to proliferate the ideology that African-Americans are "out to get white." Thus, it is not surprising that one of the six interviews whom I recorded told the story of a group of teenage friends armed with bats who went to Newark to "beat up" on African-Americans. At the time this person was in the army and living in Harrison, New Jersey, a town adjacent to Newark, and said:

Well, they thought it was going to spread into Harrison and so people in effect were preparing themselves for battle. Sort of an interesting concept. And I had friends (I didn't go... and I think back now part of the reason I didn't go was I think was mostly in army uniform for most of the time, and didn't have civilian clothes that fit anything) but I had a lot of friends who drove into Newark, actually looking for trouble. They would go into Newark with bats and stuff looking for fights.

They believed that the rioters would eventually reach their area, and decided that instead of waiting for the African-Americans to come to them, they would reach the African-Americans first. This story shows how the media both reflects and reinforces the fears and beliefs of the dominant group. At another section of the interview, he commented on the rationale of the white neighborhoods:

Because what people were saying in my town is that what they're doing is dumb, they're looting their own neighborhood. They'll have to realize that eventually. And they'll go into the white neighborhood and loot. Plus where they were, everything was a shamble, there wasn't much left, so we figure we were next... For the most part people thought it was dumb. Most people said that this was only an excuse to loot and riot. Most people would say, how is going into a store and stealing a television helping out.

Such accounts reflect the racialization of African-Americans and the presentation of them as a threat. This perceived threat seemed enough to justify state repression. This is important to understand because many civil rights groups protested to the administration that if the state troopers and National Guards were removed from the area there would have been less deaths and violence. Recall from Chapter 2 that most of the violence occurred on the day, and days after, the arrival of law enforcement officials.

The article does not give any credence to the charge of police brutality. Many White Americans believed, as I will show in my interview, that police brutality is rare in the African-American community. What White Americans consider rare African-American consider normal. Furthermore, Whites also believe that even if police brutality existed, it does not warrant a riot. They see it as irrational. The previous quote from the U.S. News and World Report helps people believe in the chaotic and irrational nature of the riot, while dismissing the organization and the political

significance of the riot. In addition, the illegal activities of the law enforcement officials is not something remembered in the collective memory of the riot. I am also arguing that perhaps the state use too much enforcement. I want to show the law enforcement officials mistreatment and hostile attitudes toward the African-American community, and the disregard by the media of the larger political significance of the riot.

II Government

On August 8, 1967 Governor Hughes created the Commission on Civil Disorder with the goal of providing the people of New Jersey with a "realistic analysis of the disorders, and practical proposals, which hopefully, will prevent their recurrence in our state (preface of the report)." Thus the focus of the Commission was to analyze the causes of the riots in order to prevent them in the future and to prepare the state to handle such situations better. The Commission believed the problems that caused the riots were also the responsibility of the federal government, so they advocated innovative national policies and more economic aid to the state. They also believed a cooperative effort between the state, county, and local governments will be needed to deal with the state's urban

environments.

Although the focus of the study is Newark, the report dealt with the uprisings in Paterson and Engelwood¹¹. The report is divided in two sections, the first section discusses the problems that existed in the city before the riots, which include welfare, health, education, unemployment, and political disenchantment. The second section discusses the "disorders that broke out against this background." The Commission then discusses the policy recommendations.

There were significant findings in the state government report which support Paige's study. According to the Governor's Commission (1968), of the 1,465 people arrested, 95% were African-Americans, 75% were younger than 32, 73% were employed, 90% were Newark residents, 54% were residents for more than 7 years, and about 50% were born in a Southern state (pp. 130-31).

The Commission argued that the problems that caused the riots can be alleviated if "we have the will to act." At the same time members of the Commission thought that the problem was the Negro problem:

¹¹ What happened in these cities is not the focus of the paper but it is important to show that it was not only in Newark that the uprisings occurred. Understanding that this happened elsewhere might lead us to realize the fear that the state officials had and why they acted in such a repressive manner.

"But one great issue remains unresolved: the place of the Negro in American society" (preface to report).

They refer to the Civil War and argue that the Negro problem was what divided this country in the 1860's. As it becomes evident in our discussion, there are ambiguities and contradictions in some of the views of the Commission. At the same time that it argued we must act together, they also believed that the African-American were partly to blame. Therefore, they present the problem as the "Negro Problem," not as the "American Problem."

At the same time that they argued for national and state policies, ultimately they always stated that it was the African-American community that can bring forth the most significant changes in the community. The Commission stated:

The Committee recognizes the significance of the community themselves to change the City of Newark.

This explanation seems to imply that the African-Americans ultimately have the control of the means of production and material resources of society. One of the main issues of the riot was the African-American's community want and need for political control of their community. The Commission believed the city needed more federal aid so they knew that

resources must distributed but they did not support such redistribution when they ultimately blame the African-American for the cause and responsibility of the riots and the Newark community.

The Commission conducted a survey and found that many African-Americans and Whites were dissatisfied with the "Negro Community." Whites and African-Americans were not only dissatisfied with the community, but blamed each other for the conditions of the city. In the introduction the Commission stated that the fundamental issue that the riots represented, "The Central Issue with which this nation has temporized for the past 100 years- to make equality real for the Black man (pg.xi)." The report suggested that the government needed to act more and that the city needed more to be done by politicians. Ambiguity exists here in that they seem to put the responsibility for change on the politicians, but they constantly maintained that the city was in such a condition because of the African-Americans who lived there. At the same time that they argued for more action by politicians, they did not blame them for the existing social conditions.

The Commission denied that there was any profitable advantages to the riot. They considered the riot as disturbing peaceful everyday life and they used a hierarchial value system that placed institutional forms of

collective action over noninstitutional form of collective action. The Governor's Commission (1968) stated:

No group of people can better themselves by rioting and breaking laws that are enacted for the benefit and protection of everyone. The cardinal principal of any civilized society is law and order. Riots must be condemned (pg. xii).

This is a concrete example of what Charles Tilly's contends in his article, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," that the privileged oppress in the name of order. The Commission regards collective violence as a threat to the peaceful political milieu of everyday life. The following quote, which is similar to the prior one, not only exemplifies this belief but is evidence of the Commission (1968) using mass society Theory to explain the riot:

The primary responsibility of government toward a threatened riot or mass violence is prompt and firm action, judiciously applied and sufficient to restore peace and order (pg. xii).

The Commission not only supported actions of the police, National Guard, and State police but they also recommended more force in the future and more money to police departments to better equip themselves if collective violence happens again. The linguistic elements of civil society and order are important to note in that it shows the

ingrained conservative attitude that the Commission had toward the riots. It becomes clear the Commission supported the status quo and existing sociopolitical structures by believing in and recommending use of state force to return to normal. Again, the point is not that state force should not have been used but that they shouldn't have harassed and killed innocent people. For example a 12-year-old and a 16-year-old were shot dead by police officers, one was shot walking outside of his home.¹² The following quote from Tilly (1968) analytically describes the discourse used in many explanations of collective action :

Our customary language obscures the interdependence of collective violence and everyday social organization. Words such as "riot," "disorder," and "disturbance," reflect the views of authorities, rivals, and unsympathetic observers. They presume that someone has willfully disrupted normally peaceful social order by acting violently, and thereby justify repression of the "rioters." They distinguish sharply between "force," the use of physical coercion by authority, and "violence," the use of physical coercion by people who lack authority (pg.62).

Those who rioted were "violent" but the law enforcement officials were using "force" to return to peace. The Commission believed in the application of justified "firm" and "judicious" action. The Commission also did not give credence to the complaints that were made by residents of

¹² Appendix C are the deaths of the riot as reported by the Commission.

the city about the destruction and damage that were done by the law enforcement agents. (Tilly indicated how many times the initiator of collective violence is the government.) The Commission reported some of these complaints, but did not blame the government for not handling the residents' grievances.

Methvin did not write about the official complaints that were made by residents of the city. Methvin failed to account for the unjustified use of force and property damage by law enforcement officers. There were various examples of unnecessary use of force by the government, but yet the Commission recommended more force. At the same time the evidence was in the report in the quotes by residents testifying about their inappropriate behavior, the Commission asked for more force. What the report showed was that what they needed was organization, not more force.

It is important to point out that the riots officially lasted almost a week, from Wednesday, July 12 to Monday, July 17. The report testified that the National Guards, State Police, and Newark Police were there longer than they were needed, which was on Friday evening, Saturday, and Sunday. It was during this time that the law enforcement agents over stepped their boundaries, as shown by the accounts by Mrs. Enez King in chapter 2. In addition to Mrs. Enez King's testimony, the Commission (1968) provided

the testimony given by Alfred Henderson, who said that the law enforcement officials fired at this store because he had a "Soul Brother" sign, which he used to communicate to the rioters not to loot his store. This seems to support the claim that the rioters had specific targets:

At midnight Saturday, Alfred Henderson, who owns a photography studio on Clinton Avenue and who lives at this address, heard shooting. After one or two hours, he said the shooting sounded closer. From a second-floor window he saw a black unmarked car, a State Police car and two National Guard trucks drive slowly up the street. A man in shirtsleeves in an unmarked car fired a weapon towards his studio on the floor below. The next morning, Mr. Henderson said, he found that the plate glass had been broken. He had written "Soul Brother" on the front of the studio (pg 121).

Mr. Henderson's testimony is an example of the hostile attitude and inappropriate behavior of law enforcement officials. These are the kinds of incidents that were not reported in the media, in part because they used the mass society perspective to explain the riot, and because of all of the blame they place on the African-American. For example, The Director of the Newark Police Department, Mr. Spina, reported to the Commission (1968) that the National Guardsmen sometimes used their weapons without justified use:

I think a lot of the reports of snipers was due to the, I hate to use the word, trigger-happy guardsmen, who were firing at noises and firing indiscriminately sometimes, it appeared to me, I was out in the field at all times (pg. 136).

What is evident by Mr. Spina's testimony is that a large part of the reports of sniping were committed by law enforcement officials, and this was the sniping which justified more force. This gives support to the view that if there wasn't so much state force there would have been fewer deaths. The Commission added to this by saying,

There is no doubt that some shooting that was reported as sniping was firing by policemen, The large numbers of armed men on the street and inadequate communication among the various unit was a critical factor (pg. 136).

The Commission's statement and the testimony also gives credence to the view that law enforcement officials were not concerned about the safety of the people in the community. It also might reflect that the mentality for some of the officials was a "us vs. them" mentality. These types of incidents and mentality are some of the reason why people of color feel differently from Whites toward law enforcement.

II Interviews

A: Interviewee 1 : New York City Resident

Interviewee number 1 was an attorney for the U.S. Government at the time of the riot and later prosecuted mayors throughout the state, including Mayor Addonizio.

Like many of the other interviewees, he describes the riots as chaotic and a warlike state. He lived in New York but travelled to Newark every day. He remembers the following:

I came to New Jersey in January 1966. For the purposes of doing work, I took an apartment in NYC. And you know I travelled back and forth everyday. I don't remember exactly when the riot broke out. My best recollection was summertime. And I remember very odd circumstances. Once the riots started, it was the oddest thing because everyday I would come in it was like entering a war zone. And when I went home at night it was very normal.

Similar to my other interviewee, Interviewee number one was only able to remember a state of chaos at the time, but when it came to specifics as to why the riot occurred, there wasn't much of a response. Yet, without remembering the specifics they claim that the riot should not have occurred because they perceived it as destroying their own community. They do not realize that many of the stores that were attacked were not owned by people in the community. According to Hayden, they attacked stores which "ripped" people off through illegal practices. Many of the interviewers commented on their threat to safety. They were very fearful what was going to happen. Interviewee 1 comments (We are talking about Prudential's choice to stay in Newark):

Can't bring all of these people in to a degenerating

place in which there is escalating violence and danger. You wouldn't want your wife or your daughter, you know. It has nothing to do with color or race, it has to do with basic safety. You couldn't get people to work because they were afraid and if they had to work late at night or even into darkness- the people were afraid to walk the streets.

The previous quote exemplifies the obsession with safety and the fear of the masses. This quote is testimony of the Whites' fear of African-Americans and of the perceived chaotic state of the situation in Newark. According to Interviewee 1, there is no justification for the riot, for he perceived it as unexplainable violence. He condemns rioting and protest as a way of expressing grievances to the state:

I don't believe that and I don't believe that the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. believed it as well, and I don't think that anybody, no matter what color they are, can legitimately believe that in the United States of America, violence is a tool for social reform, because violence begets violence, and the wind that would come after would blow everybody down.

As mentioned before, none of the White interviewees were able to explain why the riot occurred. They all had vague notions about the conditions for the riot. The White interviewers say that the riot was about the injustice that African-Americans suffered, but they offer no more detail. When asked about police brutality, they say that maybe happened. Although they were unable to articulate the claims of the African-American community, they all condemned

the riot, for they viewed it as irrational. They thought it was irrational because they thought that the rioters were burning their own stores.

What they remember about the riot is chaos and destruction, but not specific details about the riots. During the interview, I proposed the following question, his answer follows:

Let's suppose that you were in a room with the leaders and people that were going to riot, let's say a week before, and they say to you: Well, we are going to riot because the administration is not paying attention to our needs, we have been brutalized by the police, and we just don't see any avenues to remedy our problems. What solutions or what advice would you give them if you were right there sitting with them a week before the riot?

First of all, I'm not sure I totally understand what you are asking me. I can tell you the Newark riot did nothing but destroy the city. Closed lines, destroyed properties, and didn't advance one social thing... All those riots did was to destroy the city, and send with its big push right on its backside down.

What I am emphasizing is the inability of the Whites that I interviewed to talk about the claims of the African-American community or to offer viable alternative solutions to the problems. They were unable to state what the African-American community was fighting for. I had the feeling that they did not want to talk about the issues that affected African-Americans, for they knew that they were discriminated in this society. But I felt that it was hard

for them to admit that this is a racist society especially to one that is not white. It is also evident with this interviewee and the others, their difficulty with assessing the different levels of power that Whites and African-Americans possess. The frustration and difficulty with recognizing white privileges might be exacerbated by the belief in a pluralist model of politics, what I call a "normal" concept in North American culture.

I want to emphasize that I am not condemning the use of the law enforcement officials in the riot but their inappropriate behavior towards people in the community. There is a long history of this behavior by White law enforcement officials toward African-Americans. What I emphasize in these interviews is that the responses given by the White interviewees do not account for this history and the racist concepts of African-American, which is aided by mass society notions.

B. Interview 2: Harrison, New Jersey Resident

I have previously used Interviewee 2 in the section of the media, for some of his comments were similar to the ones in the media. There were some analysis made by this interviewee that revealed much of what the Whites believed in his town about the African-Americans in Newark. He says

that at the time Harrison was a big industrial town and that although it was mostly a White town there were African-Americans working in the same factories as Whites. He says that the Whites thought that there were two kinds of African-Americans, those that were hard workers and those that didn't want to work. Those that didn't work hard were called "Newark Niggers." He explains:

When I think back about it, they weren't called African-Americans, they were called Negro or colored people. There were two groups: there were the hard-working crowd of people, Black folks who would work along with my mother and father in factories. And then there were what they called in all honesty, **Newark niggers**. These were the two groups. One was trying to take care of the family, getting the best for their families and what they called the Newark niggers who wanted whatever the government could give them, and the impression was that they were the ones who rioted.

The interviewer in the above quotation shows how some Whites adopted the mass society perspective and the racialization of the African-American by believing that those who rioted were lazy. In addition, these Whites believed that some African-Americans were **essentially** lazy, by not wanting to work and accepting "government handouts." These view was challenged by Paige for he showed that many of those that rioted had jobs.

C. Interview 3: Kearny, New Jersey Resident

This interviewee was living in Kearny, New Jersey at the time and worked in a Municipal Bond office in downtown Newark. According to this interviewee, there was a sense that there was going to be a riot, a point that Hayden made. She says that she would shop with her mother in such stores as Macy's and Klein's.

Although the riot area was not near the businesses area, she expressed the worry that many had about being affected by the riot. She comments on what she remembers one day after going to work after school:

We noticed that there were hardly any cars. Traffic was practically nothing. It was like a ghosttown. It was the strangest, eeriest feeling to see this big Newark city, that I always gone to shop, and people were always bustling around. So I got off the bus, and we entered the building that I was working, we went into this big Municipal bond company. And there was nobody there. Then I was really concerned, when the boss, the man who owned the company, told me that he couldn't believe that I came down to Newark. I said that I was in school all day. So he walked me outside the bus stop and said not to go to work until things would calm down. That's what I really remember about the Newark riots.

This interviewee lends support to the view that many Whites were fearful that the rioters were going to affect them.

The riot was on Springfield Avenue and 17th Street, an area not near the downtown area. However, when asked about the causes of the riots or the claims of the African-American community, there wasn't much depth:

All I remember was that my parents and grandparents saying that it is getting very dangerous getting to work, and that it was a Black thing against Whites and Whites against Blacks. That is all I remember.

The other interviewees gave similar explanations to what happened in the riot. They thought the African-Americans were "out" to get Whites. This, I argue, is the racialization of the African-American as criminals and as dangerous, especially when there is a riot. Mass society notions intertwine with racist concepts of African-Americans.

D. Interview 4 and 5: Newark Residents

The African-American couple that I interviewed lived in the riot-area and live there presently. The husband said that the State Troopers were the worst of all the law enforcement officials. He said, "They were nasty. The National Guard just blocked that area off but the state police was all over." He was working in Montclair at the time and travelled back and forth between the Newark and Montclair. He remembers that during the riot, he had difficulties going from Montclair to Newark, because some areas were blocked off, and many people were denied entrance into areas of the city.

The wife said that she remembers the presence and

actions of the law enforcement officials, some of which were recorded in the Governor's Commission. This gives more evidence for the inappropriate behavior of the officials.

She says:

The National Guard- they broke into liquor stores and they shot a boy for a soda- what that little six year old going to do with a soda-it's just a soda, they didn't have to shoot him for that. That was wrong because they could have taken the soda away from the boy... They were shooting up all in people's houses. I think it wouldn't of been so bad if they hadn't brought those state troopers in. I think that their biggest mistake was to bring those state troopers. The thing is that the state trooper did more damage than the police did. They were just riding around and shooting.

The event that she remembers was supported by the Commission. The young boy was not 6 but 12. This, of course, is not significant, what is significant is that the young boy was shot. Appendix C shows the boy on the list of the deaths reported by the Commission.

The couple does not agree with the burning of the stores but they disagreed with the shooting of innocent people and the law enforcement officials using their weapons unnecessarily. This is a part of what I argue in this thesis. The wife also said that some of the cops helped people loot the stores, which shows that not all the cops were evil towards the people. She says,

I went over to Springfield Avenue. I just wanted to see what happened, you know. And there was two cops and they were having the people load the car and then when other cops would come by riding, they say here come a cop, go now, go now. They were allowing people to take stuff.

This shows that not all law enforcement officials acted hostile toward the people. This also might show that there was probably a different relationship between the local officials and the outside law enforcement officials. The couple believes that the problem was mostly with the State Troopers and National Guard.

Conclusion

We discussed in the beginning of the chapter where the media used mass society images in their explanation of the riot. The Governor's Commission did the same but to a lesser extent. The interviews discussed showed that Whites were very fearful that the riot was going to reach them. This fear was shaped in part by the media.

The media does not account for the organization of the people and the inappropriate behavior of the law enforcement, which was documented in the Governor's Commission. In this chapter, I showed that the consequences of adopting the mass society view is that it renders an incomplete view of what occurred. I am not denying that

there was no disorganization, but that it was not at the level reported by the media.

It was also evident, especially in interviewee from New York that the belief on an open political systems, and to a certain extent the belief that this is a democracy where all citizens can be heard, helps Whites adopt mass society views on collective action.

Conclusion

So What?: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Discourse

In the introduction to the thesis, I commented that the mass society perspective is an elitist way of collective action. It is elitist because it does not account for the organization of the people and their rational capacities. Le Bon thought that the crowd was inherently stupid and this notion permeates much of the media's account as shown in the last chapter. Le Bon's notion is elitist as well because it devalues crowd action and behavior while glorifying the European concept of civilization. These elitist ways of treating crowd action reflect the politics of its users, who support institutional forms of collective action, and assume a pluralist model of politics. They believe that all groups have equal access to shape and change the system. The politics of the mass society perspective reflects itself in the discourse that is used to discuss crowd behavior. Discourse is a critical site that reflects political perspectives. In chapter three, I showed that the mass society discourse renders an incomplete understanding of the Newark riot.

My project uses a different discourse because it reflects a different political perspective than mass society, one that accounts for the organization of the people and their rational actions. The authors used in this study argued that the riot was not as disorganized as represented in the media. Thomas Hayden argued that the riot was very organized, while the law enforcement officials were, at times, disorganized. He argued that the people were shooting in the air to slow down the law enforcement officials, and that a very small part of the community was armed. He also commented that the people were acting against stores which "cheated" the community. His account of police misconduct was supported by the Governor's Commission report and the testimonies given by Mrs. Enez King, Alfred Henderson, and Police Chief Spina, as presented in chapter 3. Paige showed that the rioters who had jobs were not as alienated as characterized by the mass society theorist.

What I attempting to show was that discourse reflects politics, and the significance of this is that analyzing discourse is sometimes an effective way of uncovering the "normal" concepts that are used in this culture. What I have done in this thesis is to help uncover "normal" concepts. Some of these normal concepts are that people involved in riots are irrational, that the actors should use

the systems's processes, that the actors disturb a peaceful society, and that the actors are opposed to a peaceful society. My thesis challenged these views about the Newark riot.

The discourse used in the 1967 Newark Riot reflected the belief in a pluralist model of politics. Both in the collective memory of many North Americans and in the media, there was the belief that individuals are heard by the system, and that institutional channels are effective for all groups. Thus, it was difficult for the interviewees to articulate an alternate course of action for the African-American.

Through the interviews I also show that sometimes these "normal" concepts are racialized in this country. Thus, it is "normal" to think of African-Americans as criminals and as irrational. This racialized concept of the African-American intertwined well with notions of mass society views of collective action, for irrationality and fear of the crowd are part of the mass society perspective. Thus, the idea that African-Americans wanted to attack Whites during the riot was very much present in the minds of Whites, as my interviewees showed. The media and some Whites did not consider the riot as a way of the African-American community expressing their grievances or communicating to larger society the needs of the community. What I am attempting to

show is that these normal concepts have real consequences. In the riot, many people were harassed and killed in part as a result of these normal concepts.

I hope this project has helped others to uncover some "normal" concepts in this society and their consequences. I have showed its result in the Newark riot, and I hope I show the importance of uncovering "normal" concepts.

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Appendix A John Smith's Testimony to the Governor's Commission

He had a picked up a woman passenger near City Hospital sometime between 9:30 and 11:30 pm Wednesday. His encounter with the two patrolmen came after he turned right at the corner of 15th Avenue and Sixth Street. He said a police car was doubled parked at the corner of South Seventh Street and 15th Avenue. Mr Smith said he gave a signal and passed, but then was immediately pulled over to the side. One of the policemen in the car asked for Mr. Smith's license and registration. When the cab driver asked, "What Happened?" he was told that he had "popped an intersection (passing at the intersection going west in the eastbound lane). Mr Smith said he replied, "I don't see how because you were doubled parked and I thought you were working and I just made a normal pass. Because he felt the policemen were "trying to play games" with him, he added, "Go ahead and do what you want to do."

At that point, according to the taxi driver, the questioning policemen, "evidently... incensed, jumped out of the police car and snatched the door open and told me to get out because I was under arrest." The passenger "was insulted" by the policeman and told to leave the car. Mr Smith was placed in the back of the patrol car and another car was called to pick up the cab. When the other car arrived, the first car proceeded to the Fourth Precinct.

On the way to the precinct, Mr Smith stated, one of the policemen sitting in the front seat turned around and began to punch him. The policeman who was driving told his companion to stop. Mr Smith quoted him as saying, "No, No, this baby is mine."

As a result of a particularly painful blow in the groin, Mr Smith said, he was unable to walk out of the car to the police station. He said he was dragged out of the car and down the streets until the citizens who were observing protested.

Once in the station he was taken into a room by the arresting policemen, who, according to Mr. Smith, were joined, by seven or eight others, all of whom began kicking and beating him "for a lengthy period of time." He said he was dragged to a cell and the beating was continued. He said that a policeman threw water from a toilet bowl over him, and another-one of the arresting policemen-struck him in the head with a gun butt and in the right side with a blunt instrument (Report for Action 106).

Appendix B Police Officer's Testimony to the Governor's Commission

Patrolman Pontrelli testified that he and Patrolman DeSimone were on routine patrol duty at dusk on July 12 when Mr. DeSimone observed a Safety Company taxi close in behind the police car, which was traveling west on 15th Avenue. Alternatively breaking and accelerating, with its high beam flicking on and off, Patrolman Pontrelli said, the cab tailgated the patrol car for almost a block. Then the cab "shot around us at the intersection of 15th avenue and South Seventh Street and went approximately one block on the wrong side of the street up to about South Eight Street and 15th Avenue."

The two policemen pursued the cab to South Ninth Street, where they stopped it. They reported that, when the driver was asked for his license and registration certificate, he answered with insults and curses. When Mr. DeSimone told the driver he was going to arrest him, Mr. Smith responded by opening his car door, striking Mr. DeSimone in the chest and then punching him in the face. Mr. Pontrelli came to his colleague's aid and, after a struggle Mr. Smith was subdued and placed in the patrol car.

After calling another patrol car to tow the taxi, Patrol 42 started for the Fourth Precinct. En route, the two policemen said, the prisoner became violent, fought with Mr. DeSimone, and struck Mr. Pontrelli, who was driving.

At the precinct, the two policemen testified, Mr. Smith refused to leave the car and when they pulled him out he refused to walk. Each policeman then took an arm of Mr. Smith and began dragging him across the street. They were met in the middle of the street by patrolman who took Mr. Smith's feet and the three carried him to the precinct. Just before entering the building, Patrolman Pontrelli said Mr. Smith again became violent (Report for Action 105).

EXHIBIT C-117. HOMICIDES —

No.	Name	Address	Age	Race	Location
1.	Rose Abraham	42 Blum St., Newark	45	N	Brought to hospital by husband
2.	Elizabeth Artis	38 Prince St., Newark	68	N	At home
3.	Tedock Bell	411 Bergen St., Newark	28	N	Brought to hospital by friends
4.	Leroy Boyd	322 Belmont Ave., Newark	37	N	On sidewalk, Belmont & Avon
5.	Rebecca Brown	293 Bergen St., Newark	29	N	At home—in apt. window
6.	Mary Helen Campbell	380 Hawthorne Ave., Newark	40	N	In a car at High & Spruce Sts.
7.	Rufus Council	1 Prince St., Newark	32	N	On sidewalk at 69 So. Orange Ave.
8.	Isaac Harrison	176 Howard St., Newark	73	N	In the street at Springfield & Broome
9.	Jessie Mae Jones	255 Fairmount Ave., Newark	31	N	On her stoop, 255 Fairmount Ave.
10.	William Furr	2 Hollywood Ave., Montclair	24	N	On the sidewalk at 125 Avon Ave.
11.	Hattie Gainer	302 Hunterdon St., Newark	53	N	In her apt., 302 Hunterdon St.
12.	Raymond Gilmer	555 Ferry St., Newark	20	N	In the street at 744 Bergen St.
13.	Rufus Hawk	103 Spruce St., Newark	24	N	At or near 949 Frelinghussen Ave.
14.	Oscar Hill	497 Belmont St., Newark	50	N	
15.	Robert Martin	24 W. Market St., Newark	22	N	On the street at Broome & Mercer
16.	Albert Mersier	117 Oliver St., Newark	20	N	On the sidewalk at 368 Mulberry St.
17.	Eddie Moss	240 Livingston St., Newark	10	N	Passenger in car at Hawthorne near Belmont
18.	Cornelius Murray	16 Wainwright St., Newark	28	N	On the sidewalk, Jones near Springfield
19.	Victor Louis Smith	32 Barclay St., Newark	22	N	In a hallway at 26 Edmond Place
20.	Michael Pugh	340—15th Ave., Newark	12	N	On the sidewalk in front of his home
21.	James Rutledge	171 Lehigh Ave., Newark	19	N	Inside of Jo-Rae Tavern, Bergen & Custer
22.	Eloise Spellman	322 Hunterdon St., Newark	41	N	<u>Inside her apartment</u>
23.	James Sanders	52 Beacon St., Newark	16	N	At or near Sampson's Liquor Store, Springfield & Jones
24.	Richard Tulliaferro	124 No. 7th St., 100—11th Ave., Newark	25	N	Leaving a store at So. 3th St. & 11th Ave.
25.	Det. Fred Toto	58 Smith St., Newark	33	W	Broome & Mercer Sts.
26.	Capt. Michael Moran	66 Eastern Pkwy., Newark	41	W	At scene of a fire, Central & So. 7th St.

Appendix C

NEWARK RIOT 7-14 — 7-17

Date	Autopsy Report	Ballistic Report
7-15-67 11:45 A.M.	Homicide by shooting. Gunshot wound, right hip.	Insufficient characteristics for identification 1-38 cal. bullet).
7-16-67 4:35 A.M.	Heart attack.	
7-14-67 4:30 A.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound right front chest. Indicates passed through.	Passed through.
7-14-67 10:30 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound back of left chest.	Irregular lead fragment. No good for ID ("00" buckshot pellet).
7-15-67 6:30 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound left abdomen.	NONE
7-14-67 5:30 A.M.	Auto accident. Fractured pelvis. Car she was in struck a fire engine.	
7-14-67 5:30 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound left side of head.	Insufficient characteristics for identification 1-38 cal. bullet).
7-14-67	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun wound of chest and abdomen.	1-double "0" buckshot pellet no value.
7-14-67 7: A.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound back of head passed through.	22-cal. bullet. 6 lands and 6 grooves, left twist.
7-15-67 2:55 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun wound of back.	NONE
7-15-67 9: P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound of left chest passed through.	Passed through.
7-18-67 1: A.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound of back of head passed through.	Passed through.
7-15-67 10:06 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun wound, fractured skull front.	1 lead fragment no value for ID.
7-14-67 6:30 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound, right chest.	NONE
7-14-67 7: P.M.	Homicide by shooting. 1 bullet wound, right arm. 1 bullet wound, back left chest.	NONE
7-14-67 11:55 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound in back, passed through.	Passed through.
7-14-67 8:30 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound back of right ear, passed through.	Passed through.
7-14-67 7: P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound left chest, passed through, bullet wound left arm passed through.	Passed through.
7-16-67 8:25 A.M.	Overdose of narcotics.	
7-17-67 12:50 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound of right abdomen, passed through.	Passed through.
7-16-67 5:15 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun and bullet wounds of back.	5-38 cal. bullets: 2 of the 3 bullets, insufficient characteristics for ID: 3 bullet with a rifling of 5 lands, five grooves, right twist: 17-00-12 gauge shotgun pellets leaving no rifling.
7-15-67	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun wound left side of neck, passed through. Superficial wound on neck.	Passed through.
7-14-67 4:10 A.M.	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun wounds back and left arm.	NONE
7-14-67 11:15 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Shotgun wounds of back.	NONE
7-14-67 7:30 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Small caliber bullet wound, left chest.	22 cal. lead nose portion) bullet recovered.
7-15-67 10:45 P.M.	Homicide by shooting. Bullet wound left flank, metallic bullet.	Core of 30-06 rifle bullet recovered. Not valid ID. Casing not recovered.